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S1 Local and global stability of a feasible equilibrium
point
Ref. 14 introduced a Lyapunov function to grant the global stability of any feasible point
under some constraints on interaction strengths. In the linear Lotka-Volterra version
(h = 0), this theory works as follows. Let B be the interaction-strength matrix, i.e.,
B =
[
β(P ) −γ(P )
−γ(A) β(A)
]
.
Assuming that we can find a strictly positive diagonal matrixD, such thatDB+BtD 
0 (59 ), a Lyapunov function can be constructed to prove the global stability of any feasible
equilibrium. In this case, the matrix B is called Lyapunov-diagonally stable. Practically,
it is a complex task to find a suitable matrix D. A very strict condition would be to
impose that the matrix B itself has to be positive definite.
On the other extreme, we can simply look at the local stability of a feasible equilibrium
by looking at the Jacobian matrix. Assuming that P˜ and A˜ is a feasible equilibrium, the
Jacobian is then given by
J = −

P˜1 0 · · · · · · · · · 0
0
. . . . . .
...
...
. . . P˜S(P )
. . .
...
...
. . . A˜1
. . .
...
...
. . . . . . 0
0 · · · · · · · · · 0 A˜S(A)

[
β(P ) −γ(P )
−γ(A) β(A)
]
.
Now, if the real parts of all eigenvalues are strictly negative, the feasible equilibrium is
locally stable. The problem with this approach is that we have to evaluate the Jacobian
and its eigenvalues for every possible feasible point. Fortunately, the concept ofD-stability
solves this issue (15,60,61 ). A matrix M is called D-stable if for every strictly positive
diagonal matrix D, the real part of the eigenvalues of DM are strictly positive. Then, if
the interaction-strength matrix B were to be D-stable, any feasible equilibrium is granted
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to be at least locally stable. Note that Lyapunov-diagonal stability implies D-stability.
Importantly, all these different conditions on stability are imposing constraints on
the interaction strengths. Assuming the strength of the competition matrices β(P ) and
β(A) are set such that without mutualism any feasible equilibrium is stable, then these
different notions of stability constrain the level of mutualistic strength that the system
can handle before losing the stability of a feasible equilibrium. Intuitively, in the linear
Lotka-Volterra case, the mutualistic interactions have to be “weaker” than competitive
interactions to have the stability of a feasible equilibrium.
4
S2 Numerical test of the two conjectures for the global
stability of feasible equilibrium
We provide details on the numerical simulations supporting our two conjectures related to
the stability of a feasible equilibrium. Note that for a level of mutualistic strength of zero,
i.e., γ0 = 0, any feasible equilibrium point is automatically globally stable. Indeed, the
competition matrices are chosen positive definite, thus according to Ref. 14, any feasible
equilibrium point is globally stable.
To grant the global stability of any feasible equilibrium when γ0 > 0, one can use the
Lyapunov function developed in Ref. 14. However, in practice, it is a very difficult task to
find the positive diagonal matrix D such that DB +BtD  0, and even more difficult to
prove it for a full family of matrices. D-stability is a more relaxed condition (15,60 ), but
as before, it is very difficult to prove that a given matrix is D-stable. However, we find
that a very general result can be postulated. First, we need to formulate two conjectures:
Conjecture 1: if the interaction strength matrix M is Lyapunov stable, then M is
D-stable.
Conjecture 2: if the interaction strength matrix M is Lyapunov stable, then any
feasible equilibrium is globally stable.
Recall that for a given network, mutualistic trade-off, and interspecific competition
strength, a matrix B is Lyapunov stable when the level of mutualistic strength is below a
given critical value γ0 < γ
r
0. However, there exists a stronger constraint on B within which
the two conjectures can be proven. If we impose B to be positive definite, i.e., B+Bt to be
Lyapunov stable, then it has already been proven that B is D-stable (15,60 ). This proves
our Conjecture 1. Moreover, following Ref. 14, there exists a Lyapunov function for any
feasible equilibrium point. This proves our Conjecture 2. As for Lyapunov stability, the
matrix B is positive definite if the level of mutualistic strength is below a critical value
γ0 < γ
s
0, which is stronger than the the critical value for Lyapunov stability (γ
s < γr0).
Thus, our two conjectures are partially proven and need to be numerically check only over
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a restricted range of mutualistic strength (from γs0 to γ
r
0).
For each of the observed networks, we explore the mutualistic trade-off of δ = 0, 0.1
, 0.2, ... 1.5, interspecific competition of ρ = 0.2, and 10 equidistant steps in the level of
mutualistic strength between the two critical values γs0 and γ
r
0 with the following numerical
simulations. For conjecture 1, at each step we generated 1000 samples of strictly positive
diagonal matrices D and tested whether DB is still Lyapunov stable. During this test,
we find no counter-example, thus our conjecture 1 seems to hold.
For conjecture 2, in each step from above, we chose 1000 different feasible equilibria
and 1000 different initial points for the numerical integrator, and tested whether the
numerical simulations converge to the chosen feasible equilibria. We find the numerical
simulations always converged to the same chosen feasible equilibria, indicating that our
conjecture 2 also holds.
If it would be analytically proven that the interaction-strength matrix B is Lyapunov-
diagonally stable when it is only Lyapunov stable, our two conjectures would become
theorems. Indeed, in this case we would have equivalence among Lyapunov stability,
D-stability, and Lyapunov-diagonal stability. Additionally, Lyapunov-diagonal stability
implies global stability for any feasible equilibrium point. Mathematically, our interaction-
strength matrix B can be seen as a two-by-two block Z-matrix, where the diagonal block
contains the positive definite mean-field competition matrices and the off-diagonal blocks
are non-positive matrices. The equivalence of the three types of stability is known for
Z-matrices (40,60,61 ), but remains an open question for block Z-matrices.
Finally, we run numerical simulations to show that the stability conditions derived
within the linear Lotka-Volterra model imply also stability for our nonlinear dynamical
model. What we have to show is that if B is Lyapunov stable, then Bnl is also Lyapunov
stable for any positive plant and animal abundance. As for the two conjectures above, we
explored the mutualistic trade-off of δ = 0, 0.1, 0.2, . . . , 1.5 , interspecific competition of
ρ = 0.2, and 10 equidistant steps in the level of mutualistic strength between zero and γr0.
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For each step we generate twice 1000 diagonal matrices where the elements are sampled
from a uniform distribution between 0 and 1. Then, we multiply the two off-diagonal
blocks of the matrix B by two of these random matrices. This procedure mimics the fact
that in the nonlinear model the mutualistic interactions have a dominator greater than
one. We find that all the generated matrices are Lyapunov stable. This indicates that
the stability conditions derived in the linear version hold for the nonlinear version too.
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S3 Critical value of mutualistic strength
The main consequence of our two conjectures for stability is that to determine the stability
of a feasible equilibrium, it is enough to look at the eigenvalues of the interaction-strength
matrix B. Thus, for computing the critical value in the level of mutualistic strength γr0,
we just need to find the critical value of γ0 at which the real part of one of the eigenvalues
reaches zero. Importantly, as shown in Fig. S1, we find that for any given mutualistic
trade-off and interspecific competition, the higher the level of mutualistic strength, the
smaller the real part of the eigenvalues of B.
Additionally, we find no particular pattern in how the critical level of mutualistic
strength varies with the specific model parameterization. In Figures S2 and S3, we
show how mutualistic trade-off δ and nestedness influence the critical value of mutu-
alistic strength γr0. For this, we randomize the observed networks and compute the slope
of the linear regression between this level of mutualistic strength and nestedness. While
in the majority of cases the slopes increase along with the mutualistic trade-off, we find
that these slopes can be positive as well as negative, meaning that there is no general
pattern.
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S4 Stability and feasibility for strong mutualism
Our study of mutualistic networks is still limited to mutualistic interactions that are
weaker than our critical value of mutualistic strength (γ0 < γ
r
0). Recall that below this
critical value, any feasible point is granted to be globally stable. Mathematically, we
can disentangle the feasibility condition from the stability one, like in the two-species
competition system. Here we explain how our dynamical system reacts to a mutualism
that is stronger than our critical value of mutualistic strength—that corresponds to the
strong mutualism regime (6,39 ). In the case where the handling time is zero (h = 0), the
system usually blows up depending on the sign of the intrinsic growth rates (43 ). In the
case where h > 0, it is always possible for any level of mutualistic strength to have both
feasibility and local stability (39 ). Recall that any set of positive abundances can be turn
into a feasible equilibrium point just by adjusting the intrinsic growth rates, such that
the right side of Equation 2 vanishes.
Now, if we linearize the dynamics around this equilibrium point (A∗i , P
∗
i ), we get the
following linear Lotka-Volterra system:
dPi
dt
= Pi
(
α˜
(P )
i −
∑
j β
(P )
ij Pj +
∑
j γ˜
(P )
ij Aj
)
dAi
dt
= Ai
(
α˜
(A)
i −
∑
j β
(A)
ij Aj +
∑
j γ˜
(A)
ij Pj
)
,
where α˜
(A)
i =
∑
j β
(A)
ij A˜i −
∑
j γ
(A)
ij P
∗
i /(1 + h
∑
j γ
(A)
ij P
∗
i )
2 and the linearized interaction
strength γ˜
(A)
ij = γ
(A)
ij /(1 + h
∑
j γ
(A)
ij A
∗
i )
2 (similar expressions hold for plants). In this
linearized version, the mutualistic interaction strengths are now dependent on the abun-
dances at the equilibrium point. Moreover, the linearized interaction strengths are in-
versely proportional to the square of these equilibrium abundances. Then, for any level of
mutualistic strength, if the abundances at the feasible equilibrium are large enough such
that all eigenvalues of
B˜ =
[
β(P ) −γ˜(P )
−γ˜(A) β(A)
]
have a strictly positive real parts, this feasible equilibrium is locally stable. This simple
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mathematical fact implies that now we cannot completely disentangle the feasibility con-
ditions form the stability ones. There exists a proper subspace of the positive quadrant
(S ⊂ RS≥0) such that when the feasible equilibrium is inside (A∗i , P ∗i ∈ S), it is globally
stable only inside the subspace S (14,43 ). In turn, this implies that if the intrinsic growth
rates are too low, a feasible equilibrium may be unstable, and thus the domain of feasi-
bility is also bounded by below. In general, we still have that for any level of mutualistic
strength, the system can be at a feasible and locally stable equilibrium. However, it is
more difficult to determine the complete set of conditions for feasibility and stability.
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S5 Derivation of the structural vector
Here we provide the full analytic derivation of the structural vector. While the derivation
is made with a linear version (h = 0) of the dynamical system (Equation 2), numerically
we find that this is already a good approximation to the general solution (Fig. S4). Since
we are interested in the existence of a feasible equilibrium point, i.e, P ∗i > 0 and A
∗
i > 0
such that evaluated at that point the right side of Equation 2 vanishes, we have to solve
the following linear system of equations:
[
α(P )
α(A)
]
=
([
β(P ) 0
0 β(A)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=C
−
[
0 γ(P )
γ(A) 0
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=Γ
)[
P
A
]
. (S1)
We do this by diagonalizing the matrix C−Γ per block, and obtaining two independent
systems of equations, one for the plants and one for the animals. This is achieved by
multiplying by the matrix T = 1 + ΓC−1 both left sides of the equation. This is the same
technique as used in Ref. 6. The new equivalent system is given by:
[
α(P ) + γ(P )(β(A))−1α(A)
α(A) + γ(A)(β(P ))−1α(P )
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=
α(P )eff
α
(A)
eff

=
[
β(P ) − γ(P )(β(A))−1γ(A) 0
0 β(A) − γ(A)(β(P ))−1γ(P )
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=
β(P )eff 0
0 β
(A)
eff

[
P
A
]
(S2)
Using this mathematical transformation, we have moved from an observable param-
eterization space to an effective competition framework. Here, α
(P )
eff and α
(A)
eff are called
effective intrinsic growth rates, and β
(P )
eff and β
(A)
eff are called effective competition rates.
This is called so because the new linear system of equations, for the fixed point of plants
and animals, is equivalent to the system of a purely competitive system within plants and
within animals. Since the form of the equation is the same for the plants than for the
animals, we will present the solution without the superscript (A) or (P) for the sake of
clarity.
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The system that we have to solve has the form αeff = βeffN . However, here we
have to keep in mind that we are interested in how the existence of feasible solutions,
i.e., solutions with strictly positive species abundances (N∗i > 0), are a function of αeff .
Since the matrix βeff may not be symmetric, we solve the system using its singular value
decomposition βeff (59 ):
βeff =
 | | |u1eff u2eff · · · uSeff
| | |

︸ ︷︷ ︸
=Ueff

λ1
λ2
. . .
δS

︸ ︷︷ ︸
=D

− v1eff −
− v2eff −
...
− vSeff −

︸ ︷︷ ︸
=Veff
. (S3)
The columns of matrix Ueff are composed of orthonormal vectors called the left singu-
lar vectors, the rows of matrix Veff are composed of orthonormal vectors called the right
singular vectors. The elements of the diagonal matrix D, called the singular values, are
positive and can be ordered without loss of generality, such that λ1 ≥ λ2 ≥ · · · ≥ λS ≥ 0.
Assuming that all singular values are strictly positive, i.e., the matrix βeff is nonsingular,
the solution for the equilibrium point N∗ is unique and given by
N∗ = β−1effαeff = V
−1
effD
−1U−1effαeff =
S∑
k=1
vkeff
1
λk
< ukeff |αeff >, (S4)
where < ui|αeff > denotes the scalar product between the vectors ui and αeff .
Now, we will explain how effective growth rates can be chosen such that all species have
strictly positive abundances at the equilibrium point. This needs two extra assumptions on
the matrix βeff : all elements of matrices β
t
effβeff and βeffβ
t
eff should be positive. Then,
using the Perron-Frobenius Theorem (theorem 8.4.4 in Ref. 60, this implies that all the
elements of the singular vectors u1 and v1 are strictly positive. If we choose αeff = u
1
eff ,
then the equilibrium point, which is given by N∗ = 1
λ1
v1eff , is a feasible solution (i.e.,
N∗i > 0). Note that any vector collinear to u
1
eff leads to a feasible solution, i.e., u
1
eff
generates a vector of effective growth rate resulting in feasible solutions. Using effective
growth rates on that specific vector, one can make any mutualistic network perfectly
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persistent (see Figure ??). By imposing N∗i > 0 to the solution in Equation S4, we derive
the following inequality:
∑S
k=1 < u
k
eff |αeff >< vkeff |αeff > − < u1eff |αeff >< v1eff |αeff >
< u1eff |αeff >< v1eff |αeff >
≤ λ2
λ1
. (S5)
This inequality is the generalization of Equation 20 in Ref. 6 to the case where the
competition matrix βeff is not necessary symmetric. This inequality holds for plants and
animals and tell us that the higher the collinearity of the effective intrinsic growth rates
αeff with the leading singular left u
1
eff and right v
1
eff vectors, the higher is the chance
of obtaining a solution where all species are persistent. The left side of this inequality
shown in Equation S4 is called deviation from the structural vector and the sentence
above can be rephrased as: the lower the deviation, the higher the chance that all species
are persistent.
Effective intrinsic growth rates (α
(P )
eff and α
(A)
eff ) are not the observable parameters of
intrinsic growth rates (α(P ) and α(A)) of plants and animals. Thus, one has to move back
from the effective competition framework to the observable parameter space. This can be
achieved by using the inverse of the matrix T = 1 + ΓC−1 on the left and right leading
singular vectors of β
(P )
eff and β
(A)
eff :
[
α
(P )
L
α
(R)
L
]
= T−1
[
(u
(P )
eff )
1
(u
(A)
eff )
1
]
and
[
α
(P )
R
α
(A)
R
]
= T−1
[
(v
(P )
eff )
1
(v
(A)
eff )
1
]
(S6)
This transformation generates results in a left and right vector of intrinsic growth
rates for both the plants and the animals—what we call the structural vector. As in
the effective framework, the higher the collinearity of the intrinsic growth rates with the
vectors generated by these left and right structural vectors, the higher the number of
persistent species.
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S6 Resampling model
To study the effect of nestedness on the structural stability of a given network, we generate
alternative network architectures using a resampling model. Traditionally, the Erdo˝s-
Re´nyi model, the swap (or fixed) model, and the probabilistic model have been used.
However, as shown in Figure S8, these models generate networks with a very restricted
range of nestedness.
Here, we use a resampling procedure that is able to generate a large range of nestedness.
This is important in order to generate significantly different nested architectures, and in
order to obtain better statistical estimates of the effect of nestedness on structural stability.
This procedure is based on the matching-centrality statistical model (46 ). Moreover,
these restrictive generative rules are biologically justified by the constraints imposed by
the phylogeny (34 ).
The matching-centrality model aims to infer the probability of a link between two
species (pij, i is an animal, and j is a plant) by assuming that the species are characterized
by a latent trait of centrality (v∗i and f
∗
j ) and a latent trait a matching (vi and fj). The
model is given by
logit(pij) = −κ(vi − fj)2 + φ1v∗i + φ2f ∗j +m. (S7)
In this way, centrality traits quantify variability in degree, while matching traits quan-
tify the assortative mating structure. The parameters κ, φ1, and φ2 are positive scaling
parameters that give the importance of the contributions of the terms. Although these
latent traits are a priori unknown, they can be estimated from the network itself. Then,
based on their estimation, the probability of a link between all pairs of plants and ani-
mals is estimated. Thus, a new network can simply be generated by drawing randomly
the links based on those estimated interaction probabilities. The expected number of
links, as well as the expected degree of the sampled network are equal to the ones of the
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observed networks. However, this model, which can be viewed as a probabilistic version of
the swap model, also generates a restricted range of nestedness. To relax this constraint,
we generalize the model by introducing a control parameter, that we call temperature T ,
that modulates the level of stochasticity in the model:
logit(p(T )ij) =
1
T
(−κ(vi − fj)2 + φ1v∗i + φ2f ∗j )+m(T ). (S8)
Here, the intercept m(T ) is adjusted for each temperature value such that the expected
number of links is equal to the observed one. When the temperature goes to infinite, our
model converges to the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi model, when the temperature goes to zero, the system
freezes in the most probable configuration predicted by our model.
As it can be observed in Figure S4, when varying the temperature, our model can
reproduce a larger range of nestedness compared to the ones generated by alternative
sampling models. Importantly, our model predicts also a maximum and a minimum
level of nestedness that the system can reach, when generative rules (represented by the
matching and centrality traits) are introduced.
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Fig. S1: Real part of the eigenvalues of matrix B as a function of the mutualistic strength (γ0). Here
we use the empirical network located in Yakushima Island, Japan (see Table S1), a mutualistic trade-off
δ = 0.5, and an interspecific competition ρ = 0. The vertical dashed line represents the critical value of
mutualistic strength γr0 above which at least one of the eigenvalues has a negative real part.
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Mutualistic trade−off
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Fig. S2: Mutualistic trade-off and critical value of mutualistic strength. For each of 23 observed mutual-
istic networks (see Table S1), this figure illustrates how the mutualistic trade-off influences the maximum
level of mean mutualistic strength that the system can handle to guarantee the stability of any feasible
equilibrium. One can see that, in the majority of cases, the mutualistic trade-off enhances the level of
mutualistic strength.
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Fig. S3: Nestedness and critical value of mutualistic strength. For each of 23 observed mutualistic
networks (Table S1), this figure illustrates, as function of the mutualistic trade off, the linear effect of
nestedness on the maximum level of mean mutualistic strength that the system can handle to guarantee
the stability of any feasible equilibrium. One can see that in the majority of cases, the slopes of this
effect increase along with the mutualistic trade-off.
18
resampling ER probabilistic fixed
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
N
es
te
dn
es
s
Fig. S4: Model-generated nested architectures. For the observed mutualistic network in the Snowy
Mountains, Australia (see Table S1), the figure shows the different distributions of nestedness values
generated by different models: our resampling model, the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi model, the probabilistic model,
and the fixed or swap model.
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S7 Structural stability across observed mutualistic
networks
Fig. S5: Structural stability in all the observed networks. The darker the color, the larger the positive
effect on the area of structural stability. The lightest regions correspond to architectures with a negative
effect on this area. Dashed lines correspond to different values of mean strength level. Solid lines
correspond to the observed values of nestedness and mutualistic trade-offs.
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Fig. S6: Structural stability and nestedness. Keeping the observed mutualistic trade-off fixed, the figure
shows the extent to which the observed nestedness (solid line) can modulate the area of structural stability
(partial fitted residuals) across different values of mean mutualistic strength.
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Fig. S7: Structural stability and mutualistic trade-offs. Keeping the observed nestedness fixed, the figure
shows the extent to which the observed mutualistic trade-off (solid line) expands the area of structural
stability (partial fitted residuals) across different values of mean mutualistic strength.
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S8 Robustness of results to the choice of ρ and h
Fig. S8: Equivalent to Figure 5 in main text but where handling time is now sampled from a uniform
distribution between 0.08 and 0.12 for each of the species.
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Fig. S9: Equivalent to Figure S5 in SM but with ρ = 0.4.
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Fig. S10: Equivalent to Figure S6 in SM but with ρ = 0.4.
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Fig. S11: Equivalent to Figure S7 in SM but with ρ = 0.4.
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Fig. S12: Equivalent to Figure S5 in SM but with ρ = 0.6.
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Fig. S13: Equivalent to Figure S6 in SM but with ρ = 0.6.
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Fig. S14: Equivalent to Figure S7 in SM but with ρ = 0.6.
29
S9 Data
Network Animals Plants Interactions Location
M PL 004 101 12 167 Central New Brunswick, Canada
M SD 001 21 7 50 Princeton, Mercer, New Jersey, USA
M SD 002 9 31 119 Mont Missim, Morobe Prov., New Guinea
M SD 003 16 25 68 Caguana, Puerto Rico
M SD 004 20 34 95 Cialitos, Puerto Rico
M SD 005 13 25 49 Cordillera, Puerto Rico
M SD 006 15 21 51 Fronton, Puerto Rico
M PL 006 61 17 146 Hickling, Norfolk, UK
M PL 007 36 16 85 Shelfanger, Norfolk, UK
M SD 008 10 16 110 Mtunzini, South Africa
M SD 009 18 7 38 Santa Genebra Reserve T1 SE, Brazil
M SD 010 14 50 234 Tropical rainforest, Trinidad
M SD 011 14 11 47 Calton, UK
M PL 013 56 9 103 KwaZulu-Natal region, South Africa
M SD 012 29 35 146 Santa Genebra reserve T2. SE, Brazil
M PL 017 79 25 299 Bristol, UK
M SD 014 17 16 121 Hato Raton, Sevilla, Spain
M PL 019 85 40 264 Snowy Mountains, Australia
M PL 024 18 11 38 Melville, Island, Canada
M PL 025 44 13 143 North Carolina, USA
M PL 033 34 13 141 Ottawa, Canada
M SD 020 33 25 150 Nava Correhuelas, S. Cazorla, SE, Spain
M SD 023 8 15 38 Yakushima Island, Japan
Table S1: Data set. We apply our study to the 23 quantitative mutualistic networks published at
www.web-of-life.es at the time this analysis was conducted (see also Ref. 34). These networks represent
diverse environmental and biotic conditions. Network identifiers consists on a combination of letters
and a specific number: M PL and M SD stand for mutualistic networks of pollination and seed dispersal,
respectively. The order of the networks matches the one used across the panels of Fig. 6.
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